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Preface
This essay comes from reading and studying works and au­
thors of the literary tradition called “continental philosophy,” a school 
of critical thought as artistic as it is academic. Never limiting itself to a 
particular body of writing, continental philosophy allows the thinker to 
liberally address issues of morality, sociology, psychology, and ontology 
across texts, from literary fiction to political theory. The mythology and 
philosophy of the West’s antiquity, studies of the Bible, and early mod­
ern human analyses (anthropology, psychoanalysis, etc.) are of particu­
lar interest to this school. The purpose of this interdisciplinary and often 
baffling pursuit: to question what we think and how we think. In this 
mode of thought, questioning what we believe to be true is always more 
important than positing some new claim to truth.
Like much of philosophy, the continental school spends as 
much effort revisiting and critiquing itself and its own thinkers as it does 
developing new branches of thought. Critique is a way of expanding 
a thought and taking it in new directions, introducing new themes and 
possibilities to test against and make trial of the old. This form of argu­
ment can be a disagreement between one author or idea and another, 
but often critique is more an academic attempt to expand an idea 
beyond where it has been taken thus far—to create new meanings and 
questions. Critique makes philosophical thought inexhaustible, always 
refining and exploring.
Jacques Derrida is the subject of the present essay’s critique.
He is a French thinker prominent in what is called Deconstruction, a 
sub-school that refines ideas by taking apart the use, choice, and mean­
ing of language used to express them (Levinas was Derrida’s contem­
porary, and both French Jews). The essay reflexively adopts some of his 
style. It is further influenced by the Italian philologist Giorgio Agamben, 
who observes the historical issues of politics, philosophy, and theology. 
Both are aleady concerned with the political theorists Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and Carl Schmitt, whose thought on power and legality 
played a role in the philosophy of the Nazi party. Ovid, the Roman poet 
and cataloguer of so many stories that have informed Western thought, 
and Herman Melville are also common interests in critical theory, but I 
have taken the liberty of introducing Mr. Stewart and Dr. Anthony whose 
honest observations and academic research, respectively, of the ancient
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cultures of the old world easily find their place in this question human 
identity and power.
Topically, this essay is about exploring human power by ques­
tioning some of its underlying human mechanisms, thus calling into 
question non-human (animal) elements, all while having a little fun. Key 
in the opening of this discourse is the French bete, which means “ani­
mal” and “stupid,” from the Latin brutus, whose English sister is the 
word “brutal” or “brute.” The scope of the project leaves out so many 
considerations, which is why it is limited to an experimental critique of a 
particular passage posed by Derrida. In spirit, however, this text is a kind 
of game at language and ideas that, nevertheless, should be taken a bit 
seriously.
§1 Loomings
David Attenborough selects a hauntingly violent series of stock 
footage to include in his special documentary on wolves, depicting their 
slaughter in the wild. A pair of hunters looms by helicopter over one 
animal trailing through a thin wood (fig. 1). When the marksman makes 
his shot, the wolf turns instinctively to confront its backbiter, and find­
ing nothing there, instead flails and 
howls in the snow, gnawing its own leg 
in its death throes (fig. 2). The rifleman, 
several hundred feet In the air, unseen, 
untouched, barely heard, looms om- 
nipresently and terrifyingly In such a 
way Derrida might call a pas de loup, 
stealthily. ‘Walking like the wolf is, to 
Derrida, proper to the sovereign who 
causes great anxiety—we never know 
what/who it is, how many there are, 
and where it lies. Spreading open the 
language of a pas de loup (that, with 
minute shifts in wording, can suddenly
take on drastic new meanings), we begin to see the fundamentals of 
sovereignty with which Derrida sets up his explorations in The Beast & 
The Sovereign. Really, “there is no wolf [pas de loup] yet where things 
are looming a pas de loup, the wolf Is not there yet [le loup n’y est pas]... 
there is only a word... a fable, a fable-wolf, a fabulous animal” (5). Just 
how real can we allow this fabulous animal-sovereign to be? Derrida
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places the sovereign, and in doing so also characterizes it, saying.
Like God, the sovereign is above the law and above humani­
ty, above everything, and he looks a bit stupid [bete], he looks 
like the beast, and even like the death he carries with him,
that death that Levinas says is not 
nothingness, nonbeing, but nonre­
sponse. (57)
Looming over us, hovering 
above law, Derrida’s sovereign is 
derived from Carl Schmitt’s “decisive 
entity, [that] is sovereign in the sense 
that the decision about the critical 
situation, even if it is the exception, 
must always necessarily reside there 
Fig. 2: A wolf, shot. [j ©. in sovereignty alone]” (Schmitt,
38), but it is also always a wolf, a 
werewolf. At some point, we realize that we must discover where this 
tabular monster came from and we must know if Derrida’s sovereign or 
if something else entirely is what is really looming in a position of power 
over man. All the while, we will be haunted by the fact that this wolf may 
in fact be no wolf, or, more precisely, it is “the insensible wolf” (Derrida, 
6). Insensibility is ‘without sense’ but also is ‘not sensed:’ not being seen 
and not being heard (stealthy). When we call for it or name it, it does 
not respond, and its silence Is what looms and gives it mystical proper­
ties. The nonresponse, to eyes or ears, engenders fear and fable. We 
must ask why the sovereign is response-less and what it means in not 
responding. To critique this sovereign is to open up its nonresponsivity, 
to find out why it is so stupid (brutal, cruel, and mute), to track it back 
to where it originates, and to discover if the exceptional position Derrida 
has assigned sovereignty seems proper to the sovereign and acceptable 
to the humanity over which it has authority.
§2 A Historical Dignity
History is the study of signs or traces by which a hunter can fol­
low a trail (or genealogy) back to the origins of his subject’s purpose or 
nature. Tracking this stealthy wolf, Derrida invents the genelycology “to 
know how to deal with the wolf,” to appropriately address and trace
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(or outline) these wolf-men and wolf-sovereigns that lurk in his “book of 
wolves” (64). Derrida’s anthropolycology, of men and wolves, is like Carl 
Schmitt’s very anthropological real politik, a political theory preoccupied 
with the history of man, his original evil, and how his politics must be 
defined by his sinful propensity (Derrida 44). Derrida is preoccupied with 
the history of man and his original wolfishness. Perhaps, since Hobbes 
(to whose tradition Schmitt belongs) and Rousseau (who vigorously and 
critically responds to Hobbes’s Leviathan with The Social Contract) alike 
have defined the sovereign as the corporate body politic of men made 
by men, our historicity of the sovereign should be concerned with how 
man fundamentally defines himself. Setting aside the origins of sin and 
its extensive body of Christian theology, let us concern ourselves with 
this original wolfishness and how the animal involves itself in man’s self- 
identity, his own body, and his political body.
Taxonomy is always a genealogical system of classification that 
wants to trace connections and give names to otherwise mysterious 
subjects in an effort to make them understandable and, necessarily, de­
mystified. Such an effort is always dubious. A tradition of understanding 
by the violence of designation, dissecting, and removing environmen­
tal contexts can only make its subject known by the language (name, 
genus, kingdom, type, etc.) that the observer forces upon it. Whether or 
not this institutionalization and categorization is a true revealing or mak­
ing known of the subject’s nature (if this is even possible), and whether 
or not these taxonomically fabricated creatures with names are real is 
always debatable. Exploring early developments in this accounting and 
science of origins, Giorgio Agamben plies into the problem that the hu­
man taxonomic designation. Homo sapiens, is the ape without specific 
identification. Traditionally, man is the animal with the sole characteristic 
that he is man only when he recognizes himself as such [nosce te Ip- 
sum], and Agamben calls this self-identifying formula ‘the anthropologi­
cal machine’ in The Open: Man and Animal. Beginning §8, titled ‘Without 
Rank,’ he says.
The anthropological machine of humanism is an ironic ap­
paratus that verifies the absence of a nature proper to Homo, 
holding him suspended between a celestial and a terrestrial 
nature, between animal and human—and, thus, his being 
always less and more than himself. (29; my emphasis)
Suspending the terms “human” and “inhuman” in the anthropological
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machine, man seeks to define himself by a separating of man and ani­
mal , perhaps in fear of the possibility of a werewolf, the monster that is 
both. Agamben addresses, here in this discourse on proper to, the mat­
ter of dignity, “which [he says] simply means ‘rank,’ and could not in any 
case refer to man.” This man without rank, who has no rank to fall into, 
is a man without place whose betweenness leaves him stranded in the 
Animal Kingdom, yet stricken by God’s image. Perhaps ‘dignity’ refers 
to this unranked betweenness between men, and, more importantly, the 
authority that facilitates it. The Latin dignus, i.e. “worth, worthy, proper, 
fitting,” might suggest such an authority. The word originates in the 
Proto-Indo-European root *dek- “to take, [and] to accept” (Harper). At 
the foundation of this facilitation of the authority that betweenness car­
ries will be the facilitation of taking and accepting, which does not refer 
to men, but what is between them.
Borges reminds us in his bestiary that Sihddartha Gautama was 
prophesied by a mystical white elephant to either save men as the great­
est of souls, or rule men as the greatest of lords. The Buddha chose the 
former, and by fasting and eschewing earthliness did he transcend. The 
temptation of Christ may not have had such similar results had this dia­
bolic debate on self-identity not taken place in the emptiness of a desert 
between places, or, more importantly, while he was neither taking nor 
accepting food. These saviors of men, in their emptiness, neither take 
nor accept.
§3 The Orality of Fear
Derrida horribly imagines, “it is as though, through the maw of 
the untamable beast, a figure of the sovereign were to appear” (18), as 
he begins to approach, in The Beast & the Sovereign, the issues of both 
roguishness and orality. The oral, for Derrida, is a colossal subject of 
love, words, breath, and spirit or animus. Politically, the mouth is the or­
gan of the body’s passage that can open to speak, a sending forth; or to 
devour, a taking in. Orality is the feral jaws of a starving wolf and it is the 
source of sovereign pronouncement and policy. The lips can be open 
in gesticulation, or sealed in non-response. The sovereign that is silent 
but wolfish will always find its nature in orality: how it rules and where it 
comes from. The issue is as deep as the abyssal gut into which it leads. 
Greeks imagined the time before order, vast and empty, as chaos or 
khaino, the yawn (Harper). This is the unknown and irrational region from 
which Derrida’s sovereign springs, and with his own mouth irresponsibly 
gluts himself like some swine or wolf or other animal. Conceptualize a
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king that has, through his lips, drank too much—he is blind-drunk and 
less responsible in his stupor. His actions will be random and potentially 
terrible. His subjects might prefer him dead, yet he must still be obeyed 
for the void of his absence will bring upheaval and disorder. An oral sov­
ereign is, in Derrida’s book of wolves, animalistic and wild, who knows 
that:
One must show oneself to be blind, make it known that one 
can be blind and stupid [bete] in the choice of targets, just so 
as to be frightening and have the enemy believe that one is 
acting at random, that one goes crazy when vital interests are 
affected. (89)
The not-knowing of the sovereign’s intentions is just as frightening as 
not knowing his shape or his location (or if he is actually there). This 
particular passage arises in Derrida’s commentary on U.S. foreign policy. 
Every possibility looms in and preoccupies the minds of the enemies 
and the subjects of the sovereign, and anxiety ensues. Derrida believes 
that the intelligence of US Strategic Command (Stratcom) is the direc­
tive to prevent the sovereignty that it represents from ever seeming too 
rational to its enemies, to make an “image of an adversary”, he says, 
“who always might do just anything” (89).
‘Loomings’ is also Melville’s title for the first chapter of his 
Moby-Dick. It is always the whale, “withholding from sight the full terrors 
of his submerged trunk, entirely hiding the wrenched hideousness of his 
jaw” (409), that preoccupies the whale hunters—Ahab most of all. Thou­
sands of words can be said of jaws and of sovereignty in this leviathanic 
tome (e.g. sailors must pass through a pair of whale’s jaws to reach the 
barroom in New Bedford to get their first shoreside drink), but it is clear 
that the colossal mouth of the whale, like the bared fangs of a wolf, is an 
item of the concealed, of the insatiable, of the greatest fear. Subjects of 
this orality of fear never know when they will be eaten nor when some 
impossible edict will be uttered. Like the outlaw or rogue that, outside 
the law, takes what he pleases, like the brutal wolf that thieves the shep­
herd’s flock, Derrida’s sovereign is excluded from civil society because 
he is cruel and hungry, and is cruel and hungry because he is outside of 
the city. This sovereign transgresses the laws (those political boundar­
ies) and, disregarding them, crosses, as a wolf crosses fences. Doing 
so, according to Schmitt, the sovereign creates a sovereign law. This is 
an exclusive sovereign that takes without accepting (as a gift) by means
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of its powerful anxiety.
Protego ergo obligo [protection therefore obedience] is at the 
foundation Schmitt’s state that is served so as to protect. It “is the 
cogito ergo sum [I think, therefore I am] of the state” (Schmitt, 52).
The constituent’s obligation to his body politic (the state) is at once a 
reflexive gratitude for being protected, but more importantly a fear of 
being vulnerable. For Derrida, fear of no-state and fear of state is the 
doubled fear of this obligation. The subjects cannot imagine how to 
protect themselves without the state or from the state itself. The horrific 
Leviathan of the Hobbes-Schmitt-Derridian legacy is the man-made and 
sovereign “Artificial Soul... giving life and motion to the body [politic]” 
(Derrida, 28). The very spirit or animus [animal] of that artificial soul is 
this; “Sovereignty causes fear, and fear makes the sovereign” (40). At 
first, this appears remarkably similar to Rousseau’s persona ficta (a fic­
tion of or formulation by the collective or “general” will of the subjects 
of the state) that demands “an obligation to something of which one is 
a member” (62). Indeed, the sovereign “General Will” within his Social 
Contract has the right to grant life and death to members of the as­
semblage: “Whoever wishes to preserve his own life at the expense of 
others must give his life for them when it is necessary” (78). However, 
Rousseau’s sovereign requires an additional identification in that it is an 
entity that “can act only when the people are assembled” (136). Only 
in an assembly of men can this sovereign be readily and repeatedly 
re-affirmed. In between each who has gathered is an argument or an 
agreement, and out of this a state is conjured and made real.
This sovereign that springs from the orality of the collective 
agreement, between each mouth, that Rousseau initiates for us seems 
so fragile without that bestial authority that Derrida relies upon so heav­
ily. Yet, its strength lies in reciprocal obligation instead of a doubled fear. 
Unlike the sovereign that springs from the orality of fear, this sovereignty 
obliges its subjects to its protection, but it is obliged to its subjects for 
substantiation and reality, and in this relation the persona ficta facili­
tates the responsibility of one speaker to another, proposing and agree­
ing, calling and responding, even in its own nonresponse. The persona 
ficta facilitates the authority of the betweenness found among the men 
who make it. If that authority is not found in the bestial exclusion that it 
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§4 Lycaon
By exception, by bestiality, by being exceptional, becoming- 
animal, becoming-exceptional, the exceptional sovereign is like the 
outlaw and like the wolf as it looms outside the law and is above the 
law (and thus, Schmitt would assert, is making law). Like God, like the 
wolf, it does not speak our language and will respond to us neither when 
we inquire after it (“what are you? where are you? how many of you 
are there?”) nor when we wish to enter into covenant with it, i.e. hold it 
accountable. As such, it can make decisions and be ‘the Decider’ for 
itself and its subjects with impunity, even if illegally, only because it has 
no capacity for an exchange. “If one cannot make a convention with the 
beast,” Derrida submits,
any more than with God, it is for a reason of language. The 
beast does not understand our language, and God cannot 
respond to us, that is cannot make known to us, and so we 
cannot know in turn if our convention is or is not accepted by 
him. (55)
This irresponsibility is, according to Derrida, the direct consequence 
of the inability of the theo-therianthropic [god-beast-person-like] sov­
ereign to communicate between subject and sovereign, to take in and 
send out, to both call and respond. The exceptional sovereign cannot 
respond, and this form of responselessness does not allow for responsi­
bility between subjects.
Melville, perplexed and consumed by this beast-sovereign, at­
tempted to divest it, reveal it and strip it of its mystery in his own ‘book 
of whales.’ Moby-Dick is more cetological (the study of whales) com­
mentary than narrative. It is a treatise on the slaughter and dissection 
of the whale; man’s attempt at attaining mastery over the leviathan.
Like genelycology, like anthropolycology, cetology is a dubious histori­
cal tracking back—historical in its taxonomic tradition and its attempt 
to disconceal origins, and dubious in that these tracings are always 
inferred, if not simply fables. [Agamben provides us with an interesting 
moment in nautical taxonomy; “A serious scientific work such as Peter 
Artedi’s Ichthiologica (1738) still listed sirens next to seals and lions, 
and Linnaeus himself, in his Pan Europaeus, classifies sirens—which 
the Danish anatomist Caspar Bartholin called Homo marinus—^together 
with man and apes” (Agamben, 24)]. In modern archaeology, whales and 
wolves even have common origins in an ancestor called therosephalian,
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‘beast-head.’ Melville’s most rigorous (though inept) attack on the levia­
than that looms over him was the development of the cetological library 
of Chapter 32. Here, folios and octavos become analogues for whales 
and their cousins—little clinical articles to flip through—and their terror is 
shown to be nothing but a common human irrationality, easily diagnosed 
and set aside in the stack.
To Melville, merely showing is a revealing that can dispel that 
fear of the jaws, the orality of fear. The Beast & the Sovereign begins 
with the assurance “we’re shortly going to show it,” which is the epi­
graph that begins La Fontaine’s poem. The Wolf & the Lamb. This poem 
predicates Derrida’s ‘book of wolves’ (and Derrida’s Rogues as well, 
for which the entire poem itself serves as an epigraph), and really does 
show the origins of this wolfish sovereignty. This epigraph within an epi­
graph on showing will serve as our taxonomy for Derrida’s wolf, both as 
a matter of the wolf’s nature and how we see it (if we can see it, if it can 
be revealed).
The hungry wolf comes to the river to drink and finds a lamb 
taking his space. The wolf accuses the lamb of drinking his water, of 
hating him, and of being protected by the dogs and shepherds that try 
to kill him. The lamb’s gentle and adroit reproaches to the wolf’s fury do 
not spare the child from being consumed.
La Fontaine’s wolf is always a respectful ‘Your Majesty’ to the 
lamb. The “cruel beast... attracted by hunger” is completely insensitive 
to the lamb’s innocence—both its new-born purity, and its guiltlessness 
in each accusation that leads to its devourment—and to the rationality 
of the lamb’s own defense, its logical argument. Derrida’s preferred Eng­
lish translation concludes: “Deep into the wood, the wolf dragged his 
midday snack. So trial and judgment stood.” Another translation (Eli Sie­
gel’s) provides a textually different conclusion that is exactly the same: 
“Into the woods, the wolf carries the lamb, and then eats him without 
any other why or wherefore.” The absence of logic is the juridical law 
appropriate to the wolf. La Fontaine thus finds his parable successful in 
its epigraphic purpose: “The reason of those best able to have their way 
is always the best [The strong are always best at proving they’re right]: 
We now show how this is true [As we’re shortly going to show].” But 
the wolf must always retreat into the woods, back into its wilderness of 
exception and exile, to carry out its judgment that provides no reason 
and no responsibility. This is where Derrida’s sovereign belongs. Above 
the company of men, outside the city walls (those boundaries of law and 
ordinance), the exceptional sovereign originates from where it acquires 
its strength, suspended between beast and God.
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The genealogical process of showing origins doubles in impor­
tance for Derrida when he proclaims the “very definition, vocation, or 
essential claim of sovereignty. [That is:] the sovereign always says or im­
plies: even if I am not the first to do or say so, I am the first or only one 
to know and to recognize who will have been the first” (92). To afford 
the sovereign a mastered position by exclusion, the sovereign declares 
Its preemptive originality, a first above firsts. Not doing, not saying, and 
never responding, the sovereign we are reaching for via the taxonomic, 
genealogical method (that we attempt to name and show to gain power 
over) is consistently elusive. Though we know where It is, or at least 
to where it must retreat, what do we know about this looming fable? 
Perhaps we need take only one step further to the poet who Informed 
the West of origins and transformations, Ovid, and his first wolf: King 
Lycaon.
Before Jove/Jupiter/Zeus even begins to groaningly recount 
“the wicked revels of Lycaon’s table” (Ovid, 8) and the guilt for which 
the Father of the Gods has held his host accountable, Lycaon-turned- 
wolf has already “fled In terror, reaching the silent fields” (10). Zeus is 
the god of hospitality and must test that quality in men always, coming 
to their doors in disguise and then revealing himself after that moment 
of either welcome or hostility (that moment Derrida calls ‘hostipitality’). 
Upon receiving the divine guest. King Lycaon decides upon hostility, and 
it is never clear why (‘without any other why or wherefore’). Even after 
Jove reveals himself, his royal host attacks and abuses his divine guest, 
mirroring that test of hostipitality by fruitlessly testing the mortality of 
Jove. Enraged, the Thunderer transforms King Lycaon’s arms into legs, 
and robes into fur, “yet he is still Lycaon, the same grayness, the same 
fierce face... a picture of bestial savagery” (10; emphasis mine). Lycaon’s 
metamorphosis reveals what will always be consistent: the sovereignty 
that befits the man and the wolf, with the same face and thus the same 
mouth (he does not forget to slaughter some sheep before his departure 
into the field!). Lycaon’s primary affront to Jove is the meal he is served: 
a hostage of Lycaon’s, boiled alive. This feeding a guest to a guest, this 
slaughter of a political hostage, who should always be protected by his 
host, is what really reveals our first wolf. The sovereign that is indistin­
guishable from the wolf has its strength in exception, but it will always 
fail the divinely-necessitated duty of hospitality in its insensibility. We 
have tracked him down and it seems that without dignity (taking-in and 
accepting guests), unworthy of God’s respect or ours, and always going
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back to that place of wolves, those woods, this first-wOlf-king is the 
original sovereign of just that: wolves, not men. Wolves make as terrible 
hosts as they seem to do guests.
§5 The Feast-Gift
Jove’s test of hospitality, which Lycaon failed, calls into ques­
tion the acceptability and divinity of the exceptional sovereign. It fol­
lows that the constitution of acceptability may be found in those who 
pass the test. Keep in mind that Jove, the patron of hospitality, was also 
the deity of law, public places (fountains), and sanctuary. Outlaws who 
invoked the name of Jove could afford protection under the law. In one 
of his most memorable tests of hospitality, Ovid tells us in Book 8 of 
the Metamorphoses, Jove disguises himself as a wayward mortal and 
approaches the doors of home after mortal home. With him he takes 
his son, Hermes. The Winged God is both the shepherd and the thief 
of herds, and notably the deity of reports, messages, lies, orators, and 
boundaries. Father and son find welcome only in the home of Baucis 
and Philemon, the poorest and final destination of these vagrant deities. 
The aged husband and wife feed their veiled guests (having possibly al­
ready recognized their divinity) their last and only goose. Their reward of 
shared eternal life as trees intertwined makes their story one of the most 
touching and rhetorical fables of hospitality in classical literature.
Abrahamic and Medieval Christianity is also concerned with any 
possible arrival of visitors who could be divine (e.g. Abraham’s visitation 
in Genesis 18, or Flaubert’s The Legend of St. Julian the Hospitator). 
“Love thy neighbor” should prepare the host to receive Christ at any 
moment, no matter his shape. Looming here is another kind of orality 
that has to do with reports, the meal (Christ, who is eaten of each week, 
is a real Host), and boundaries. Perhaps we may find here the sovereign 
that is acceptable to us, one that allows for both taking and giving in an 
orality of hospitality. Even in nonresponse, what kind of sovereign can 
facilitate a responsibility in men that provides hospitality between them?
Genealogy (genelycology), tracking back, tracing back, and find­
ing origins was crucial to placing Derrida’s exceptional sovereign, so it is 
proper to take a similar historical route in the search of this acceptable 
sovereign. Archaeologist David W. Anthony specializes in the postulated 
Proto-Indo-European culture of the Caucuses which he reveals and 
defends in his work The Horse, Wheel, and Language. This is the culture 
that mothered our language and all of its cousins and siblings, to which
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the West believes it is indebted for its cultural origins and teleologies 
(read: ‘Caucasian’). Using archaeological rigor and this reconstructed 
maternal language, thousands of years older than ours, Anthony empha­
sizes the importance of the haunting root *ghos-ti-, the doubled guest- 
host, in that culture. He says:
Guest-host relationships would have been very useful for 
a mobile herding economy, as a way of separating people 
who were moving through your territory with your assent 
from those who were unwelcome, unregulated, and therefore 
unprotected. (303)
Humanity in grasslands and deserts requires hospitality both for survival 
and to define borders. Over and over, Anthony repeats the significance 
of the guest-host and also the gift. Gifts 
were not only signs of acceptance and 
a display of wealth—they were obliga­
tions of the host/lord. With the inven­
tion of significant mobile property (i.e. 
herded livestock) came “new rituals 
and a new kind of leadership, one that 
threw big feasts and shared food when 
the deferred investment paid off’’ (155).
Those with the most food or property
represented the institution of chiefdom, and it was always their role to 
feast. Unless they gave in their taking, their subjects would not ac­
cept them. Without the feast-meal, there was no sovereign lord. Soon, 
feasting became a ritual of establishing authority, and may have, in later 
times, turned from a feasting of the people into a feasting on the people 
and their resources.
Teleologies: A final 
cause, ultimate design, 
or oveniding value. 
E.g. The idea that hap­
piness should be maxi­
mized
§6 Betweenness
Not far southeast of the Caucuses lies Afghanistan. A Scots­
man named Rory Stewart walked the West-East breadth of that country 
in 2002, going from village to snowy village and quietly crossing ethnic 
and political boundaries. In desert-llke Afghanistan’s winter, Stewart 
found himself so often alone in great between-places: between civiliza­
tion (Herat to Kabul), between one village and the next, between life and 
death, and between one encounter with men and another. Surviving on
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the hospitality of villagers and warlords he found that walking forward 
was always a matter of relating what is behind.
Everyone had memorized a chant of names [of hosts, usually 
warlords] and villages along footpaths in every direction... I 
recited and followed this song-of-the-places-in-between as 
a map. I chanted it even after I had left the villages, using the 
list as a credential. Almost everyone recognized the names, 
even from a hundred kilometers away. Being able to chant 
them made me half-belong—reassuring hosts who were not 
sure whether to take me in, and suggesting to anyone who 
thought of attacking me that I was linked to powerful names. 
(190)
Without recalling, remembering, and reaffirming that which is 
behind him with names, chants, and letters of vouching, Stewart would 
not have made the journey. This betweenness is power and protection 
in the oral society, the society of the orality of hospitality. From wher­
ever Stewart had been came the authority he brought with his arrival, an 
authority recognized by and between those who spoke it, originating not 
out of a sovereignty of fear but one of obligation. Fear was not without 
place in this place-between-places, but when Stewart found welcome 
he was, of course, fed. Then he was out of danger. Stewart shared gifts 
and accepted shelter. At times, Stewart must invoke Muslim law to per­
suade those he encountered not to attack him, or to aid him—in doing 
so he obliquely reminded them of God’s edict of hospitality. The ‘power­
ful names’ that loomed over could be said to loom a pas de loup (“there 
is no wolf... only a word”), held in suspension until sprung or spoken 
to the next prospective host; however, the names were not sources of 
original authority. He never names a king, only peers—fellow hosts who 
are also fellow warlords. The naming of names invokes a cultural author­
ity, a sovereignty between men who are between places (in the desert) 
and who seem beholden to nothing except what is between them, and 
to God, the arbiter of hospitality.
To returning to the right of life and death possessed by Rous­
seau’s persona ficta, the subject becomes bound to the sovereign not 
because of fear but “because his life is no longer the bounty of nature 
but a gift he has received conditionally from the state” (79). In a sense, 
the sovereign of the Social Contract takes life and can give it again be­
cause it is given life by a constant reaffirmation by its corporate
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constituents, and they accept what they fabricate because it arises 
from between them. The artificial leviathan ceases being the mysticetus, 
the whale that terrifyingly haunts with gaping mouth just beneath dark 
waves, and becomes a body that feeds itself [“In the days of the Mes­
siah the righteous... will feast on the meat of Leviathan and Behemoth” 
(Agamben, 1)]. Between each of these people who meet and assemble 
to speak and share meals and report of what is behind and what is to 
come is a betweenness that has sovereignty. Said sovereign is not a fel­
low citizen, but is between-fellows.
Taxonomically, the anthropological machine serves as a mode 
for differentiating man from wolf, subject from sovereign, human from 
inhuman. The exclusive sovereign relies on this differentiation for power. 
To function, Agamben says, the machine must suspend two terms to be 
forumlated: human and inhuman. In doing so, it differentiates and sepa­
rates. Agamben’s intention is to grind the “ironic apparatus” to a halt by 
bringing that suspension into suspension. The result is an undifferenti­
ated relation that carries with it power, or mastery:
In the reciprocal suspension of these two terms [human & in­
human], something for which we perhaps have no name and 
which is neither animal nor man settles in between nature and 
humanity and holds itself in the mastered relation. (83)
Most importantly for us, Agamben has, in this issue of what is human 
and what is inhuman (not our subject, though closely related in the 
overlapping issues of power and taxonomic identification), revealed that, 
“what is decisive here is only the ‘between,’ the interval, or we might 
say, the play between the two terms” (83). For Derrida, the sovereign is 
the first of firsts, and thus it holds a mastered position. But Agamben in­
forms us how betweenness is the mastered relation which it is between 
and undifferentiates man and animal, God and man, or man and man.
A bestial sovereign is suspended and fails when the terms of it being- 
beast versus being-man or being-God are, themselves, suspended.
This sovereign of betweenness does not need a position from which 
to exercise power because it’s “where” is always wherever its power is 
relevant, when there is a relationship of terms or subjects.
§7 Acceptable
Held in suspension, in betweenness, the acceptable sovereign
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looms because it is an insensible sovereign, but not quite “the insen­
sible wolf.” We have tracked it back to its place and it is not the woods 
outside the city but it is a no-place, a place-in-between, like an agree­
ment between two people. It is before and after, around and within, it is 
very concerned with borders and boundaries because it must always 
be relative to those delineations. Derrida’s wolf passes over borders, 
wantonly ignoring in its illicit movements. The acceptable sovereign 
crosses borders but in doing so generates energy across them, like the 
semi-permeable cell membrane over which ions and charges exchange. 
This is the sovereign to which dignity refers, absolutely silent in its 
nonresponse (not even a grunt, not even a sign). Taking and accepting 
are proper to it because it bestows that exchange upon its subjects over 
whom it has authority.
Derrida’s sovereign, with a wolfish head, cannot respond to us. 
The acceptable sovereign simply is without a response, especially to 
such inquiries as: ‘What are you?’ ‘Where are you?’ ‘How many of you 
are there?’ Making betweens is the business of this sovereign—setting 
up borders of propriety and of law through an orality of collective agree­
ment. Not in mediating with God or sleeping with wolves, but in medi­
ating between men and gods and wolves and mastering their relativity 
does it have power over them and under them.
The savior, as we have seen, neither takes nor accepts, and in 
so doing transcends. The exceptional sovereign takes and accepts, but 
accepts only for itself—^taking and accepting-as-taking. This is a one­
way relationship, removing the sovereign from being relative to others: 
excluding it and rendering it without a between to go to, so it can only 
flee to the woods and fields. The acceptable sovereign takes and ac­
cepts by virtue of allowing its subjects the opportunity for hospitable 
exchange. A proper host treats and feasts his hostages well. Worthy of 
men by making men worthy, this sovereign falls Into rank between ranks 
and as such Is still unranked but among the ranks (place that is no­
place). Looming because it is always there and not there and cannot be 
shown, it is without proper origin.
Maybe our first acceptable sovereign would be Gllgamesh, the 
king who goes between life and death and returns to his city to accept 
his place with some hard-learned dignity and some pride. Impossibly 
one-third divine, of cow and man, once wild and sexual but conclusively 
a sovereign of men who is everywhere: “he [simultaneously] leads the 
way In the vanguard, / [and] he marches at the rear, defender of his
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comrades” (4). He built the walls of Uruk, that place between Uruk and 
not-Uruk, which he shows to Ur-Shanabi with satisfaction upon his 
return from the world between death and life.
As Derrida says, let’s not forget the wolves, that “there Is no wolf 
[pas de loup] yet where things are looming a pas de loup.” It may appear 
as though the sovereign were a wolf because Its shadow may be mis­
construed as four-legged, and some fabulous bugbear is invented. But 
really, we never see nor hear what is truly stealthy. Like the lack of echo 
In the desert, there Is absolutely no response. The critique is that the 
sovereign is only misconceived to be above the law and humanity. In­
stead it is between law and humanity, between laws and between men. 
This betweenness is where the absolute sovereignty originates without 
origin, and where it can be found though it is entirely insensible. The 
purpose of its nonresponse is to facilitate the necessary, and divinely 
ordained, hospitality between its subjects.
Fig. 3: “Day seven, from right: Abdul Haq, 
the author, Mullah Mustafa (commandant 
of Obey) shortly after he shot at us and just 
before Abdul Haq’s departure.” (Stewart)
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Fig. 4: Places in between: Rory Stewart 
& host Aziz. (Stewart)
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